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Abstract 
The world is experiencing its worst recession in 80 years. What started as US sub-prime 
financial turmoil has developed into the first global recession since the infamous ‘Great 
Depression’ of the early 1930s. However gloomy the perspectives for the very short term are, 
there will be a recovery eventually. South Africa, Brazil and Turkey (SABT) are among those 
countries that may be expected as emerging market economies (EME) not only to continue 
to converge towards per-capita income levels of highly developed nations but also to be the 
best candidates – next to China and India – of serving as the locomotives of world GDP- and 
trade growth after the depression. Of course, whether SABT are not merely potentially in a 
position to create a brighter future for their people and the world economy but can transform 
such potentials into reality, depends on economic governance pursued by governments and 
collective actors in these countries. Therefore, it appears interesting to inquire into the 
macroeconomic governance structures of SABT in order to assess their capabilities for 
enhancing growth and employment and to converge to the OECD average in the medium to 
long run. 
JEL Classification: O 11, O 17,  P 51, P 52 
Key words: Market constellations, policy regimes, institutions, Post Keynesianism, 
comparative economic systems 
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I.  Introduction – Global growth engines for ‘After-Depression’ 
times? 
 
The world is experiencing its worst recession in 80 years. What started as US sub-prime 
financial turmoil has developed into the first global recession since the infamous ‘Great 
Depression’ of the early 1930s: In 2009, world-wide GDP is expected to fall by 2 – 3%, 
unemployment will mount and international trade contracts for the first time in decades. 
However gloomy the perspectives for the very short term are, there will be a recovery 
eventually (see e.g. OECD 2009). 
 
South Africa, Brazil and Turkey (SABT) are among those countries that may be expected as 
emerging market economies (EME) not only to continue to converge towards per-capita 
income levels of highly developed nations (or, in the measurement of the World Bank, from 
upper-middle to high income economies
1) but also to be among the best candidates – next to 
China and India – of serving as the locomotives of world GDP- and trade growth after the 
depression
2. Of course, whether SABT are not merely potentially in a position to create a 
brighter future for their people and the world economy but can transform such potentials into 
reality, depends – among other things
3 – on economic governance pursued by governments 
and collective actors in these countries. Therefore, it appears interesting to inquire into the 
macroeconomic policies pursued by SABT in order to assess their capabilities. 
 
South Africa, Brazil and Turkey also share some common features in their recent past: All 
three countries had to cope with extreme economic distortions and political unrest. While 
South Africa was economically marginalised in world trade for a considerable period of time 
during their miserable Apartheid regime, Brazil has gone through a period of extreme or, 
                                                  
1 In the World Development Indicators 2004, all three countries were still grouped as ‘lower-middle 
income economies’, by the last pre-depression year 2007, they had already moved up to the group 
of ‘upper-middle income economies’; see World Bank (2004) and World Bank (2007). Of course, 
SABT is supposed to mimik BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) which had been put forward by 
Goldman Sachs on grounds of capital market perspectives (see Goldman Sachs 2007).     
2 The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
pursues research along the same lines in their ‘Southern Engines of Global Growth’ project; see 
e.g. Nayyar (2008). 
3 Among these other determinants of long-term growth being in control of politics are such factors as 
spending on education, research and development and the potential to enhance social capital; see 
e.g. Routledge/von Amsberg (2002). 
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rather, hyper-inflation. And Turkey experienced some time of high political and economic 
instability combining major output and inflation volatility (see e.g. Önis/Senses 2007). Almost 
at the same time, around the mid-1990s, all three countries underwent macroeconomic 
policy regime shifts in order to cope with these different challenges. Moreover, they also 
witnessed political regime shifts towards more populist – leftist in the case of South Africa 
and Brazil with the take-over of the ANC government after the end of Apartheid and the Lula 
administration respectively, more religious (yet less elitist) with the Erdogan governments in 
the case of Turkey – governments which aroused expectations of economic governance 
reforms in a direction different from the neoliberal mainstream dominant during the 1990s 
and the first decade of the 21st century – particularily as unemployment and income 
inequality in SABT were seen as most pressing policy issues on the agendas.
4 However, in 
this case, the timing was different: From 1994 onwards, ANC took government, while Prime 
Minister Erdogan took Office in 2001 and President Lula da Silva in 2002. 
 
Against this background, it appears worthwhile to take a closer look at the stances of 
economic governance of SABT in order to judge on their capabilities to become the world’s 
economic steam engines in general and, more narrowly, whether the policy regime shifts of 
the past have been appropriate in this respect. This is even more pressing as most EME 
have taken on – sometimes deliberately, sometimes pressed by the IMF under the 
‘Washington Consensus’ premise – the anglo-saxon ‘neoliberal’ governance orientation that 
has come under much criticism since the outbreak of the international financial crisis (see 
e.g. Saad-Filho 2005). At the end of this decade, other policy orientations (such as 
Keynesian-style macro-economic governance) are again thinkable (see e.g. Akerlof 2007). 
Moreover, there appears to be little dispute that SABT have been underperforming in terms 
of GDP growth as compared to similar EME such as China, Malaysia or India as much as 
compared to other periods in their history.
5 This poses the immediate question whether there 
are common, systematic governance failures to be detected? A prominent candidate is the 
monetary policy of ‘Inflation Targeting’ (IT) which is often seen as deterrent to higher growth 
particularly in EME
6  – and South Africa, Brazil and Turkey all turned towards IT at around 
the turn of the millenium. Or is the famous balance-of-payments constraint known as 
                                                  
4 Although this may be perceived differently by the different socioeconomic groups of society; see e.g. 
Argüero/Carter/May (2006), Reis (2006), World Bank (2005) 
5 See e.g. Cassim (2004), Barbosa-Filho (2008), Auer/Popova (2003).  
6  See e.g. Eichengreen (2002), Epstein/Yeldan (2008), Cordero (2008). A different view is given by 
Goncalvez/Salles (2008). 
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Thirlwall’s law (see e.g. Dutt 2002) to be blamed? Rather than focussing on just one line of 
argument, this paper takes a more comprehensive view by pointing to the interrelatedness of 
different interdependent macroeconomic policy fields and their institutional embeddedness 
as has been done in recent work constituting Post Keynesian market constellation research.
7       
 
The paper is structured as follows: in part II, the theoretical foundation of the Post Keynesian 
market constellations approach is briefly exposed. Thereafter, in part III the SABT countries 
will be portrayed with respect to their institutional set-up supporting respective market 
constellations. These market constellations will be compared in part IV and comparative 
performance hypothesis thus derived will be empirically tested. In the final part V, 
conclusions for the outlook of the future SABT growth perspectives and pending institutional 
change will be dared.       
 
II. Macroeconomic  policy  regimes and economic outcomes: 
the Post Keynesian market constellation approach 
 
A.  Economic governance and the creation of market constellations 
 
It is by now undisputed that institutional and regulative involvement in economic activities not 
only influences the allocation of production factors in an economy but can also systematically 
affect economic growth and employment development. This is especially true for a 
theoretical paradigm of economic activities that can explain long-term involuntary 
underemployment (that is, not just a temporary underutilization of production factors). 
Accordingly, this model also contains in its macroeconomic interventions not a temporary 
(cyclically stabilizing) character but rather an enduring one: Post Keynesianism.
8 
 
The economic policy theory based on Post Keynesianism does not explain the short-term 
macroeconomic need for ‘market repair’, but instead describes a contingent result that 
                                                  
7 See e.g. Heise (2006), Heise (2008), Fritsche et al. (2005), Priewe/Herr (2005). 
8 Admittedly, Post Keynesianism does not represent a coherent school of thought, but there are some 
common characteristics that can be identified: an emphasis on uncertainty, an emphasis on money 
as a connection between the present and the future, a rejection of Walras’ law of the markets, the 
importance of aggregate demand and the endogeneity of the money supply. Cf. Davidson (1994); 
Palley (1996) among others. 
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contradicts the hydraulic and teleological notions of economic policy, those of the no longer 
popular standard Keynesianism, as well as those of the neoclassical mainstream (see Heise 
2009). Whereas here, the impetus for every intervention is seen as a partial or temporary 
failure of the markets, the state is regarded as a kind of opposing, “correcting third-party” by 
the market actors.
9 According to Post Keynesianism on the other hand, state intervention is 
not necessarily the result of a market failure, but rather due to the politically motivated desire 
to participate in the markets with the intention of altering market outcomes (for example, the 
employment rate or income distribution) in a certain pre-anounced way. Like every other 
market participant of adequate economic size, the state can certainly influence market 
outcomes, but its ability to steer them where it wants is limited. Depending on the reactions 
of market participants, quantity or price changes or arbitrary, difficult to predict combinations 
of quantity and price changes can appear.  
 
The interplay of individual and collective market actors on the one side and the state actor on 
the other can now be made more predictable through institutions and regulations. This 
makes it easier to plan while simultaneously reducing the haziness of the state’s steering 
ability. Specific sets of institutions and regulations, combined with sustained market 
conditions (i.e. saturation level or valuation volatilities) and political orientations can be 
identified as market constellations
10. These market constellations can be either friends or 
foes of growth and employment and inflation (as the most important policy targets), 
depending on how they influence expectations regarding future macroeconomic demand. 
Economic policy can not actually directly – teleologically – steer (real) economic growth and 
employment; it can only contribute to the creation or preservation of a market constellation 
that steadies and stabilizes the expectations of the economic actors and maintains a high 
level of macroeconomic demand if incentives are set adequately or, contrary to that, may 




                                                  
9 Which is why the image of the state as a repair shop is occasionally used. 
10 We are quite aware of the unfamiliarity of the notion of ‘market constellation’. Some authors, 
instead, refer to ‘regimes’ (see Heine/Herr/Kaiser [2005]). In order to prevent confusion, we hold on 
to ‘market constellation’, as the notion of ‘regime’ has been used by the French ‘Regulation School’ 
and the American ‘Social Structure of Accumulation School’ in a different way. 
11 See Heise (2006); Heise (2008) and Heine/Herr/Kaiser (2005) for the defintion of ‘dysfunctional’ 
market constellations. 
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Table 1: Unemployment and Inflation in Various Market Constellations 
Monetary Policy (and Fiscal Policy)   
Low degree of Central 
Bank Independence 
(accommodating) 
High degree of Central Bank Independence 
(non-accommodating) 
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Stackelberg Leadership of wage 
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INF:   high 
GROWTH: medium 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
 
‚Soskice case’: 
UNR: medium –  high 
INF:   medium -   low 
GROWTH: medium - low 
 
‚Calmfors-Drifill case’: 
UNR: low –  medium 
INF:   low – deflationary 





INF:   low 
GROWTH: high 
 
          
Notes: UNR = Unemployment rate; INF = Inflation rate; GROWTH = GDP growth; for further 
explanations, see Heise (2006); Soskice case: strong unions at the company level (“local 
Pushfullness”; see Soskice 1990); Calmors-Drifill case: weak unions at the company level (see 
Calmfors/Drifill 1988) 
 
As demonstrated elsewhere (cf. Heise 1999: 177 et sqq.), the microeconomically aligned 
institutions and regulations regarding employment relations (for example, protection against 
dismissal or co-determination and participation rules) and innovation systems (such as 
research and educational systems) exert influence primarily on the efficiency of the deployed 
production factors (i.e. the productivity development). In contrast, the macroeconomically 
oriented institutions, regulations, and governance structures described above exert their 
influence primarily on the number of deployed production factors, making them especially 
important when examining extensive growth and employment trends. If at least a short- to 
mid-term correlation exists between the labor market situation and nominal wage and price 
development, as postulated by both the original and modified Phillips curves, and if 
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concurrently the postulated neutrality of fiscal and monetary policy is rejected as 
unrealistic
12, then pre-eminent importance will be given to the ability to coordinate the various 
macroeconomic policy fields and their autonomous actors. We know (cf. Nordhaus 1994; 
Heise 2001) that the macroeconomically most advantageous performance mix emerges 
through cooperation among the central bank, government, and collective bargaining parties 
(the so-called “cooperative Nash equilibrium”).  
 
On the other hand, if the macro-actors do not achieve cooperation, then the rationality trap 
will snap closed. If this happens, it will lead to higher levels of unemployment (and 
correspondingly low levels of growth) and higher levels of inflation, despite the fact that a 
performance mix more beneficial to all parties was possible. This is the so-called “non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium”. If explicit cooperation is not feasible, yet the behavior of an 
actor can be predetermined, independent of the behavior of other actors (the so-called 
Stackelberg leadership), then one can expect performances that are better than in the non-
cooperative situation but not as efficient as in the cooperative situation (Nash equilibrium).
13 
The results of these definable market constellations are documented in Table 1 and are 
explained and described in more detail in Heise (2006) and Heise (2008). It should only be 
pointed out here that the three actor constellation cannot be adequately portrayed in a two-
dimensional space. Therefore, fiscal policy is not explicitly accounted for; instead it is implied 
that it will support and/or disburden monetary policy when necessary. In the case of the non-
accommodating monetary policy, a further distinction is made between a ‘bold’ and a 
‘tentative’ central bank.
14 The empirically well-documented insight captured by this distinction 
is that some central banks respond symmetrically to inflationary and deflationary 
developments (‘bold’) while others respond decidedly asymmetrically (‘tentative’), meaning 
they immediately adopt restrictive measures when faced with inflationary developments but 
do not address deflationary developments with correspondingly expansive monetary policy. 
 
                                                  
12 Recently, the American Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof (2007) convincingly did this, thereby 
marking the ‘end of the After-Keynes era’. 
13 Whether or not cooperative policy results are to be preferred over non-cooperative results depends 
on what the actors’ utility function looks like (a central bank focused exclusively on price stability, 
for example, can not profit from cooperation or Stackelberg leadership) and whether the utility of 
the macro actors and the welfare of the society (by principal-agent problems) is taken into 
consideration. 
14 See Dullien (2006).  
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B.  Policy rules underlying different market constellations 
 
Having established the institutional foundations of different market constellations and having 
pinpointed the criticality of cooperation among macroeconomic policy actors (procedural 
norm), the desired behaviour of the macroeconomic policy actors (norms of content) has yet 
to be exposed. As we have started off with a Post Keynesian approach to manifest market 
constellations, we will follow this line of argument in the elaboration of functional and 
dysfunctional policy regimes. Moreover, as market constellations can only be ascertained if 
the policy actors follow perceivable policy orientations as manifested in pre-announced rules, 
we will firstly expose some possible rules that have been established in the literature. 
Thereafter, a functional market constellation will be distingiushed by its normative and 
institutional requirements. 
 
B.  1 Monetary policy rules 
 
The end of the Keynesian era of economic policy-making after World War II was marked by 
Milton Friedman’s (1968), Robert Lucas’ (1972) and Robert Barro’s (1974) critique on 
discretionary monetary and fiscal policy interventions. Friedman’s monetary policy rule, 
which required the central banks to supply the economy with a quantity of money in 
accordance with the rate of change of GDP and the velocity of money, was not very 
successfull as the quantity of money is not an instrument variable itself but rather an 
intermediate target – which has often been missed by those central banks that allegedly 
followed a quantity rule. 
 
Most prominent, however, is the monetary policy rule first published (and empirically tested) 
by John B. Taylor (1993): Infaltion targeting. According to this rule, the central bank sets her 
interest rate with respect to weighed measures of output and inflation gaps whereby the 
weights reflect interest rate elasticity of wages and investment spending. Although this rule 
has gained far-reaching support summarised under the notion of the ‘new consensus’ and 
seems to be adopted by most (independent) central banks (Clarida/Gali/Gertler 1998), Post 
Keynesians have repeatedly criticised the path-dependency of the major determinant: 
potential or trend output used as yardstick of the output gap easily underestimates the output 
gap if the economy shows long-lasting under-employment of factors of production (of course, 
a very Keynesian assumption!).  
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Post Keynesians, therefore, have put forward some other monetary policy rules either – 
somewhat arbitarily – setting the targeted (nominal or real) bank rate at zero
15 or – better 
derived -  extending the inflation targeting rule by a weighed term capturing the difference 
between targeted (‘full employment’) and actual unemployment: the employment gap. 
 
B.  2 Fiscal policy rules 
 
Recently, John B. Taylor has added a fiscal rule to his famous monetary policy rule (see 
Taylor 2000: 30ff.). In this rule, he distinguishes between cyclical and structural deficits. 
Possible candidates for fiscal policy regimes would be a ‘close to balanced budget’ regime 
with structural deficits very low and the actual budgetary balance to be governed by the 
automatic stabilisers  – this could be termed ‘sound finance regime’ as it most certainly 
drives down the public debt ratio to zero in the long run.
16  
 
Secondly, a fiscal policy regime may focus on striving for the ‘golden rule’. This would set the 
structural budget deficit at a level of the public investment ratio assuming sustained public 
investment expenditure. The UK’s fiscal framework since New Labour took office in 1997, for 
instance, is based on such a ‘golden rule regime’ (see Balls/O’Donnell 2002: 168ff.).  
 
An outspokenly (old fashioned standard-Keynesian) ‘anti-cyclical fiscal rule’ is captured by 
the German ‘Stability and Growth Act’ (SGA) of 1967, in which not only the cyclical budget 
balance is governed by deviations of actual GDP from its potential level (i.e. the output gap) 
but also the structural budget balance is showing discretion with respect to output gaps.  
 
Finally, the structural budgetary balance could be made dependent not on the actual output 
gap but on the public investment ratio (as the ‘golden rule’) which, in turn, will be determined 
by the difference between trend-GDP and the trend in potential (i.e. full employment) GDP 
                                                  
15 See e.g. Wray (2007) for a nominal zero bank rate and Smithin (2007) for a real bank rate close to 
zero. 
16 According to simple fiscal arithmetic, this will be the case as long as we assume the nominal growth 
rate exceeds the ‘low’ structural deficit. 
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(which can be called ‘trend output gap’ for short). This elaborated version of the ‘golden rule’ 
regime can be termed ‘capital budgeting rule’ as proposed by John Maynard Keynes in the 
first place (see Keynes 1943). 
 
B.  3 Wage policy rules 
 
Most traditional economists would, of course, argue that wage policy should follow the simple 
rule of setting the real wage increase at the level of labour productivity increase – as long as 
a full employment situation is given. In disequilibrium, the real wage increase must undercut 
(negative output gap) or exceed (positive output gap) the increase in labour productivity.  
 
However, Post Keynesians have contested these views on two grounds: On the one hand, 
the collective bargaining partners cannot fix the real wage but merely the nominal wage.
17  
On the other hand, the recommendation of wage moderation (and wage aspiration) in 
accordance with the labour market situation is only conducive if the predictions of Walrasian 
labour market theory were true, i.e. leading to labour market clearing. That, however, is 
exactly what any kind of Keynesian theory contests as very likely. Joining the two objections, 
nominal wage policy targeting real wages in accordance with labour market disequilibrium – 
the original Phillips curve as policy norm – may cause high inflation volatility and, once an 
independent central bank has been set up to precisely prevent this from happening, output 
volatility. Therefore, Keynes himself as well as most Post Keynesians favour a wage policy 
behaviour which keeps the price (respectively inflation) level stable over a certain range of 
labour market situations: nominal wage increases should avoid a claims conflict as much as 
it should refrain from excessive moderation. The normative rule would be to claim the 
distributional margin given by the expected (cyclically smoothed) labour productivity increase 
and the inflation rate targeted by the central bank.        
 
Some Kaleckians would add a redistributive component to the above-mentioned policy rule 
arguing that the mark-up over marginal cost is power-related and a redistribution of income 
to wage-earners would increase aggregate demand and, hence, be beneficial for growth and 
                                                  
17 Of, course, by forming inflation expectations, they try to target real wages. However, these 
expectations may not only be missed but the procedure may be inherently inconsistent if inflation 
depends on wage settlements as is assumed in Post Keynesian mark-up pricing.   
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employment (see e.g. Bowles/Boyer 1995). 
 
B.  4 Institutions, policy regimes and functional market constellations 
 
There are two problems with rules: 1) there may be rules guiding the behaviour of economic 
agents, but they are not pre-announced and, hence, cannot convey the signals of credibility 
desired. For instance, the famous Taylor rule of inflation targeting seems to be followed even 
by many central banks that never officially declared to pursue inflation targeting. 2) Policy 
rules may be declared ex ante by policy actors but the degree of ex post compliance is low. 
Again, credibility is low if ex ante norms are merely seen as lip services. Therefore, it has 
sometimes been argued (see e.g. Wyplosz 2005) that rules should be investigated in the 
light of the institutional setting under which the political actor is pursuing its policy: These 
institutions may reinforce pre-announced ex ante rules as much as they may predict ex post 
compliance. 
A vast amount of literature has correlated the degree of central bank independence with 
price stability orientation often termed as ‘non-accommodation’ or ‘conservatism’ on part of 
the central bankers (see Rogoff 1985) to pursue restrictive monetary policy along the lines of 
monetarist money-supply or New Keynesian (‘tentative’) interest rate targets. Credible 
implementation of the Post Keynesian monetary policy rule needs the distinction between 
instrument and target independence and a strong institutionalisation of accountability.
18  
 
The literature on collective bargaining institutions exposed a clear – linear (the Soskice case) 
or hump-shaped (the Calmfors-Drifill case) - link between theit degree of centrality and the 
ability to control the claims conflict: According to this view, a behaviour necessary to produce 
a partly horizontal Phillips curve would need some market power on the side of Trade Unions 
as well as the willingness to take an economy-wide perspective to internalise external effects 
(on employment) arising from collective wage bargaining. This can best be expected from 
corporatist collective bargaining institutions. In the Kaleckian variant of the Post Keynesian 
rule, the capability and willingness for conflicting behaviour on part of the Trade Unions can 
be increased by establishing an intermediate (regional-sectoral, noncorporatist) bargaining 
level and system. The Walrasian rule of productivity linked real wage aspirations demands a 
decentralised bargaining structure and the lack of ‘local pushfullness’ at the decentralised 
                                                  
18 This is necessary to mitigate principal-agent-problems. 
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level.     
Table 2: Taxonomy of policy rules 
Political actor 
(Policy field) 




Central bank  
(Monetary Policy) 
-  Quantity of Money 
 
 


































bank (‘cooperative’ / 
accountable) 
Fiscal authority  
(Fiscal Policy) 
 
- Sound  finance 
 




















UK Code of Fiscal 
Stability 
 










-  No rule / market based = 
productivity orientation 
 
- Distributive  margin 
 


















Most difficult appears to be the institutionalisation of fiscal policy. This is certainly the case as 
fiscal policy – i.e. taxation, public spending and targeting a (positive, negative or zero) budget 
balance – is a critical part of democratic policy-making. Although this can be justly argued for 
monetary policy as well
19, the instruments controlled by the respective actors are certainly 
perceived as of different status with respect to their ‘technical’ or ‘political’ nature: Although 
the interest rate controlled by central banks is an important determinant of income 
distribution, the budget balance (and, even more so, taxes and public expenditures) targeted 
by fiscal authorities is far more politically discussed and object of partisan controversy. 
Therefore,  the best we can hope for
20 apart from purely discretionary behaviour is to 
establish intelligible partisan policy orientations (e.g. leftist governments pursue Standard 
                                                  
19 And, of course, this is one of the strong arguments against central bank independence. 
20 Wyplosz (2005) acknowledges these restrictions, yet wants to break the ice by proposing an 
independent  ‘Fiscal Policy Committee’ charged with deciding the public budget balance with must 
be executed by the government.  
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Keynesian anti-cyclical policies, rightist goverments pursue Walrasian sound finance policies 
and ‘New Centrist’ governments pursue New Keynesian golden rule policies) or codified 
norms such as the European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP), the British Code of Fiscal 
Stability, the German Stability and Growth Act or the American Budget Enforcement Act 
(BEA). As the evidence of partisan politics in general is marginal (see Blais/Blake/Dion 1993) 
and, in any case, no intelligible ascription of partisan ideology and fiscal policy rule has ever 
been convincingly articulated, we restrict the institutionalisation of fiscal policy rules to 
codified norms. 
 
B.  5 Functional policy regimes to create optimal market constellation 
 
As we have argued before and broadly summerized in Tab. 1, the combination of different 
policy rules or, rather, their institutionalisations in terms of policy regimes yields a variety of 
economic outcomes with respect to growth, employment and inflation (the most important 
macroeconomic policy objectives). The best performance, however, needs a coordination of 
the different policy fields (procedural norm) in order to spawn a ‘functional’ market 
constellation. According to our underlying theoretical paradigm, the following policy 
orientations (norms of content) are required (Heise 2009):            
 
•  The political actor must pursue a stable fiscal policy that fulfills the requirements of a 
sustainable path towards full employment – this can be most readily accomplished 
through a capital budgeting-oriented fiscal policy rule. 
•  The political actor must solve the problem of time inconsistency by guaranteeing 
central bank autonomy (thereby creating trust in a price stability-oriented monetary 
policy) and minimizing the resulting principal-agent problem by limiting autonomy to 
the instruments, not the goals. These goals of price stability and a sufficiently high 
level of employment and economic growth must be clearly stated and communicated 
and  accountability is required (which can best be achieved by following an 
employment-augmented IT rule).   
•  The political actor must help to reduce market valuation volatility by contributing to a 
stable exchange rate regime via institutional arrangements and by promoting (or at 
least not undermining) the willingness and readiness of Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Organisations to engage in collusion and cooperation (corporatism). 
•  The political actor must utilize institutional arrangements (such as social pacts, 
concerted actions or macroeconomic dialogues) to help ensure that the cooperation 
problem resulting from the separation of monetary and fiscal policy to independent 
actors is as minimized as the state policy carriers’ (government and central bank) 
approval of the wage policies which provide the foundation for inflation-free growth at 
full employment. 
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III. Institutions, market constellations and economic 
performance – putting SABT into place 
 
Before we will apply the above framework to our sample of countries – SABT -, we will shed 
a scant light on their economic performances during the period under investigation in order to 
get a better grasp of their respective macroeconomic conditions.    
 
Figure 1 depicts the GDP growth rates of SABT – while the pattern of the growth 
performance of Brazil and South Africa shows a similar upward trend, Turkey’s GDP is 
characterised by its high volatility: at least four periods of recession – 1991, 1994, 1999 and 
2001 – and five boom periods – 1990, 1993, 1995/1997, 2000 and 2004 – can be singled 
out. Although Turkey also experienced a weak upward trend and highest average (per 
capita) GDP growth rates among SABT, with inflation rates higher than in South Africa and 
Brazil in every year of the period under investigation and only a gradual disinflation process 
after the 1994 recession, comparison with the sample of all emerging and developing 
countries reveals, nevertheless, a clear under-achievement.  
 
Brazil experienced a deep recession in the early 1990s as a result of the so called ‘Collor 
plan’ to break hyperinflation. As figure 2 and table 3 show, this was remarkedly unsuccessfull 
both in terms of inflation and growth performance. Only the ‘Cardoso plan’ from 1994 
onwards - which included a pegging of the exchange rate to the US Dollar - brought 
hyperinflation rapidly down from above 2000% in 1994 to 66% in 1995, 16% in 1996 and 
even below 10% ever since. However, this phase of exchange rate pegging until 1998, when 
Brazil was hit by repercussions of the financial crisis in Russia and Asia and a rapid 
depreciation of the Brazilian currency occured, must also be seen as detrimental to growth: 
in table 3, both sub-periods covering the years of the Collor (1990 – 1994) as well as the 
Cardoso plan (1995 – 1999) show very low average GDP growth rates. This judgement can 
be particularly justified if growth rates are compared to those of the Newly Industrialised 
Asian Countries (NIAC) and the emerging and developing countries in total as a reference 
group and, moreover, if the difference in average annual population growth rates (Brazil: 
1.8%; NIAC: 0.8%) is taken into consideration to create per capita growth rates.      
The period from 2000 onwards after having brought down inflation to levels below 10 per 
cent shows clearly the best performance in Brazil, yet must still be rated as disappointing if 
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compared to the other country reference groups – leaving the issue of high unemployment 
unresolved.
21  
  15 
                                                  
21 According to ILO’s  Laborsta statistics, unemployment rose from about 3,7% in 1990 and around 6% 
in the mid-1990s to around 10% in the early 2000s and remained at that level during the 2000 – 
2007 period. The level of unemployment reported here must be taken very cautiously (a more 
accurate figure may be given by the unemployment rate of the major industrial area Sao Paulo 
which rose from around 10% in the early 1990s to 20% in the mid-2000s; see Camara 
Neto/Vernengo 2007), however, the trend appears valid. Laborsta reports unemployment rates for 
Turkey that rose from 7% in the early and mid-1990s to 10% since the early 2000s. No ILO 
unemployment figures are reported for South Africa, but national (official) statistics report about 
16% in the mid-1990s which rose to more than 27% in early 2000s.   
 
  Figure 1: GDP growth rates in SABT; 
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Source: IMF; World Economic Outlook 
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Notes: Inflation rates are consumer prices. 
Inflation rates in Brazil between 1990 and 1994 
cannot be displayed as they exceeded the 
100% level by far: 1990:2948%, 1991: 477%, 
1992: 1022%, 1993: 1927%, 1994: 2076%. 
Source: IMF; World Economic Outlook 
Database, October 2008  
South Africa, finally, reports a very similar performance as Brazil: After the end of apartheid, 
GDP growth rates gradually increased, while keeping inflation rates below 10 per cent with a 
slight disinflationary trend. Again, compared to NIAC and all emerging and developing 
countries South Africa’s performance must be judged as disappointing. 
 













1990 – 2007  2.6 (1.5)  2.5 (1.8)  4.5 (1.8)  5.2 (0.8)  4.7 (-) 
1990 – 1994  0.2  1.4  3.7  7.4  2.5 
1995 – 1999  2.6  2.0  4.2  4.8  4.0 
2000 – 2007  4.2  3.5  5.2  4.9  6.4 
Notes: * Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapour, Korea; ** 147 countries; average population growth rates in 
brackets 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 
 
Broadly speaking, whether inflation has been curbed drastically and shock-like as in the 
Brazilian case or brought down in a gradual process as in the Turkish case or kept under 
control as in South Africa, (per capita) GDP growth in SABT has been under-achieving since 
1990 in each of the sub-periods. The Turkish growth performance appears best (overall as 
well as during the last sub-period), while the Brazilian peformance is the weakest leaving 
South Africa with an intermediate performance. However, whilst South Africa managed to 
reduce its deviation from the EME growth performance and Brazil, after all, did not fall much 
further behind, Turkey’s position weakened from above to below average in reference to all 
EME countries. 
 
The questions to be answered in the section ahead are: ‘Does the market constellation 
approach produce sensible results in explaining our above finding’? ‘Where does SABT fit 
into the picture’? In order to find answers, we must first paint a broad picture of SABT’s 
institutional setting in the field of monetary, fiscal and wage policies.  Tab. 4 summarises in a 
broad way the institutional set-up of SABT: all three countries granted their central banks full 
instrumental independence but retained some right to set the quantitative price stability target 
by some governmental authority. By around the turn of the century, all three central banks 
had adopted some form of Inflation targeting after alternative (exchange rate targeting in the 
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case of Brazil and Turkey) or transitional (quantity of money and eclectic approaches in 
South Africa) monetary policy regimes proved unsustainable. Due to the factual or feared 
credibility lack, particular arrangements (i.e. inflation band targets in the presence of  some 
extra-attention for exchange rate movements as is the case in almost all emerging market 
economies; see Eichengreen 2002) and over-ambitious inflation targets, this type of central 
bank design creates a monetary policy orientation which we have termed ‘tentative’ earlier 
(see Plenderleith 2003, Aron/Muellbauer 2006: 12, Araujo/Santos 2007, Yeldan/Cömert 
2008). 
 
Table 4: SABT’s institutional set up 
Country  Central Bank design 
  Central Bank 
independence 
Policy regime  Characteristics 
South Africa  Full instrumental 
independence, but targets 
set by government 
Inflation targeting since 2000  Tentative 
Brazil  Full instrumental 
independence, but targets 
set by National Monetary 
Council 
Inflation targeting since 1999  Tentative 
Turkey  Full instrumental and 
objective independence with 
some rights concerning the 
setting of the targeted 
inflation rate retained for the 
government  
Implicit Inflation targeting 
2001 – 2005, Inflation 
Targeting since 2005 
Tentative 
  Collective bargaining regime 
  Coverage rate  Degree of 
centralisation 
Characteristics 
South Africa  Medium  Sectoral-regional with strong 
second tier at company-level 
Soskice case 
Brazil  High  Sectoral-regional with strong 
second tier at company-level 
Strong signalling effect of 
minimum wages 
Turkey  Low – medium  Individual, company-level  Strong signalling effect of 
backward-biased minimum 
wages 
  Fiscal Policy regime 





South Africa  Growth,Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR) / Sound finance 
 
- 
Restrictive / austere 
Brazil  Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(FRL) / Golden rule without 
specific public imvestment 
target  
+ 3,75 to + 4,5% of GDP 
Primary Fiscal Surplus 
Restrictive / austere 
Turkey  Programme for Transition to 
a Strong Economy / Sound 
finance 
+ 6,5% of GDP Primary 
Fiscal Surplus (until 2007) 
Restrictive / austere 
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As collective bargaining regimes commonly show a high degree of historical 
pathdependency, it would be surprising to find too similar institutions in the three countries 
under investigation. However, after the end of Apartheid in South Africa as well as military 
dictatorship in Brazil, trade unions were among the winners of political reforms of 
democratisation as the possibility to collide and set-up collective bargaining on the one hand 
as well as labour representation on the other hand had been strengthened. Collective 
bargaining in both countries predominantly takes place at the intermediate sectoral-regional 
level. However a strong second tier of company-level bargaining evolved giving rise – 
empirically better documented for South Africa than Brazil (see Nel 2002) – to strong local 
pushfullness termed ‘Soskice case’ before. As a heritage of its hyperinflation past and 
ensuing wage indexation, minimum wages play a considerable role as signalling device in 
Brazil.      
 
In Turkey, the influence of trade unions is much more restricted, wage bargaining basically 
conducted at the company level and the barriers to collusion very high. Under these 
conditions, the minimum wage set by the tripartite ‘Mimimum Wage Fixing Committee’ 
becomes an important standard for pattern bargaining not only for workers in the informal 
sector. 
 
Finally, all three countries experienced a combination of unsustainable public deficits, an 
integration into international financial markets and balance-of-payments problems during the 
1990s which had been addressed by IMF-imposed fiscal austerity programmes which were, 
as South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel said (with regard to South Africa but true 
for all three countries) “not up for negotiations” (see Ajam 2005: 6). Under different policy 
programme brands, but always with reference to IMF obligations and in hope to appease 
international financial markets, very restrictive fiscal policy orientations (see OECD 2006a: 
461, Giambiagi/Ronci 2004) in the line of ‘sound finance’ regimes were taken. Brazil and 
Turkey even published quantitative deficit targets in order to ‘tie their hands’. Although 
Brazil’s fiscal policy rule exposed in the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) made dispositions 
for deficit-financed public investment, the lack of any quantitative target for public investment 
puts the description as ‘golden rule’ into doubt. 
 
To conclude, SABT’s market constellation appears to be characterised by an institutional 
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setting that does not provide the pro-growth environment which the economies needs to 
create the jobs and to fulfil the expectations of government and the people. The combination 
of  non-accommodating (tentative) monetary policy regimes, uncoordinated, decentralised to 
intermediate collective bargaining settings with partly (South Africa) strong ‘local 
pushfullness’ at company level and very restrictive fiscal policy regimes, provides sub-
optimal conditions resulting in low growth, medium to low inflation (yet higher than possible in 
a different market constellation) and high unemployment (see tab. 1).   
 
IV.  Some empirical evidence on SABT’s market constellations  
 
Before we will take a closer look at empirical evidence for the explanations put forward here, 
let us extract some hypothesis: We would not only expect (1) a relatively
22 low growth rate 
and high unemployment for SABT as already established, we would also expect (2) 
relatively
23 high real interest rates which will cause (3) low private investment spending. 
Although a very restrictive fiscal policy stance showing high primary budgetary surpluses can 
be taken for granted, the overall budget balance will be heavily in deficit (4) as interest 
payments will be high. This type of fiscal-monetary conflict usually carries with it a low and 
falling public investment rate (5). Moreover, inflation will be relatively high, even though the 
SABT’s central banks take a non-accommodating stance. This is mainly so because (6) 
nominal unit labour cost (NULC) are supposed to rise quite fast since the collective 
bargaining system does not provide incentives to care for the ‘distributional margin’ 
consisting of productivity increases and targeted inflation. Finally, it would be rather 
surprising (7) to find traces of cooperative behaviour in fiscal, monetary and wage policy 
stances. 
 
A.   High real interest rates and low private investment 
 
There is not much dispute about the reversal in short-term real interest rates in post-
apartheid South Africa after being negative in the 1980s (see Kahn/Farrell 2002), and their 
                                                  
22 ‘Relatively’ must be interpreted ‘as compared to a counterfactual situation of more pro-growth 
market constellations (i.e. cooperative strategy)’ or as compared to a country showing such 
characteristics.  
23 ‘Relatively’ means not only in comparison to other countries but also in comparison to the countries 
growth rate. 
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high average level since 1995 (see tab.5 [a]) is also widely acknowledged. It is basically the 
latter phenomenon which has contributed to a less unambiguous interpretation of South 
Africa’s interest rate performance: While Epstein (2002) attributes high interest rates to the 
restrictive monetary policy stance, Aron/Muellbauer (2006) partly blame a monetary policy 
strategy based on exchange rate targeting (during the earlier part of the 1990s), partly a 
country specific risk premium. Kahn/Farrell (2002: 21; our italics) of the SARB admit that 
“…,current rates reflect to a certain extent the Reserve Bank’s overriding commitment to the 
inflation target”. However, they haste to add that a different policy stance (‘artificially low 
interest rates’) would merely result in higher inflation and higher long-term real interest rates. 
That this is not necessarily true has been argued in the theoretical part of this work and can 
be seen in countries like China or Malaysia who manage to produce much lower real interest 
rates (in absolute terms as well as in terms of growth-interest rate differentials; see tab. 5 [a]) 
without sparking unacceptable inflation (not shown in tab. 5, but inflation in China and 
Malaysia was lower than in SABT over the whole period). 
 
If South Africa’s real interest rates must be judged as high, interest rates in Brazil and Turkey 
are even higher. For Turkey, the regime change from accommodating to non-
accommodating monetary policy is clearly detectable during the 2000-2007 sub-period, for 
Brazil the move from exchange rate (1995-1999) to interest rate targeting (2000 – 2007) 
appears to have been beneficial in terms of a slight monetary relaxation. Moreover, South 
Africa’s earlier and more determined acceptance of price stability appears to have payed off 
in the last sub-period with a credibility advantage and relatively lower real interest rates than 
in Brazil and Turkey. 
 
The empirical picture about investment in SABT also fits our expectations (see tab. 5[b]): The 
low level of  accumulation in South Africa stands out and its importance for the low growth 
and disappointing employment performance has been highlighted in many studies.
24 
However, the restrictive monetary policy stance and the high real interest rates are certainly 
not the only factors of explanation – the high level of political and social risk
25 is always and 
                                                  
24 Gibson/van Seventer (2000) as well as Aron/Muellbauer (2002) report statistically significant 
correlations using econometric models of the South African economy, whereas Gelb (2001) uses 
panel data from company studies to establish a clear link between capital cost and the growth of 
firms and their investment behaviour. 
25 The standing term ‘social risk’ does not maintain that developments are predictable by probability 
calculation. Therefore, ‘social risk’ really refer to a situation of fundamental uncertainty.  
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rightly emphasized – as comparison with Brazil and Turkey indicates: although Brazil’s and 
Turkey’s monetary regime was more restrictive at least during the most recent sub-period, 
capital formation developed at a higher pace there. Again, comparison with China 
(comparative data on capital formation in Malaysia is not available) substantiates the claim 
that the rate of accumulation in SABT was, nevertheless, insufficient. 
 
And, finally, SABT’s development in comparison with China also sheds a very sceptical light 
on the ‘globalisation thesis’ whereby exposure to international financial markets and their 
‘Washington Consensus’ preconditions will be honoured by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows making up for out-crowded (by high interest rates) domestic investment. By trend, 
gross capital formation has gone down in Brazil and Turkey since the early 1990s – the 
‘globalisation period’ –  while South Africa’s marginal increase during the most recent sub-
period may well point to a very different reasoning: Epstein (2002) provides some evidence 
on reverse causality running from higher economic growth to higher FDI rather than vice 
versa. 
 
B.  Budget Balances and public investment 
 
In order to render a judgement on public finances in SABT as intentionally pursued policy 
regime possible, cyclically adjusted fiscal balances – i.e. the ‘structural’ budget balance – 
need to be looked at. However, data is consistently available only on overall budget balances 
including the cyclical component. On the one hand, fiscal elasticity with respect to the 
business cycle is usually assumed to be rather low in emerging market economies (as 
compared to highly developed countries), on the other hand output volatility is much more 
pronounced – overall budget balances will have to be enough to indicate the policy stance all 
the same. Moreover, the primary balance, i.e. excluding interest payments, tells a more 
adequate story about the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy as interest rate payments 
have merely a (re-)distributive character.    
 
Tab. 5 (c) shows some striking features: the regime shift towards an extremely restrictive 
fiscal policy stance is detectable in all three countries stressing primary as well as overall 
public balances. In Brazil, the ‘Collor Plan’ sub-period had been cushioned by a relaxation in 
fiscal policy, while in Turkey overall fiscal balances in the most recent sub-period are 
distorted by the extra-cost of earthquake damages in the early 2000s.  
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However, extraordinarily high primary budget surpluses – indicating the restricted room to 
manoeuvre for public policy – did not translate into equally low overall budget deficits or even 
surpluses due to very high interest rates resulting from monetary restriction. In the case of 
South Africa and Brazil, the monetary-fiscal policy mix did not even allow for a substantial 
reduction of public debts. 
 
Table 5: SABT – Empirical evidence 
  South Africa  Brazil  Turkey     
a) Short-term Real Interest Rates, 1990 - 2007 
              China  Malay-
sia 
1990-1994  2.0 (0.6)    3546 (--)    5.5 (-1.0)    -1.8 
(12.7) 
2.6 (6.7) 
1995-1999  7.5 (-4.9)    12.9 (-
10.9)    -7.6 
(11.8) 
  2.0 (7.1)  2.9 (2.3) 
2000-2007  3.5 (0.7)    10.2 (-
6.7)    11.1 (-
4.9) 
  2.1 (8.0)  0.9 (4.6) 
b) Trends in investment (gross fixed capital formation), 1990 – 2007 
              China   
1990-1994  16.4    19.3    22.6  37.9  
1995-1999  16.3    18.0    22.4  37.6  
2000-2007  17.0    16.0    19.6  40.2  
c) Trends in public finances, 1990 – 2007 
1990-1994  -4.0 NA  -14.9  3.4        
1995-1999  -4.2 NA -2.9 0.5 -7.8 2.2    
2000-2007  -1.3 NA -1.5 3.8 -7.0 5.3    
d) Trends in Public Investment, 1990 – 2007 
                Malay-
sia 
1990-1994  4.8    3.3    6.9     12.9 
1995-1999  4.7    2.4    5.6     11.5 
2000-2007  4.3    2.1    3.2     NA 
e) Nominal Unit Labour Cost (NULC), 1991 – 2007 
              Poland  Spain 
1991-1994  NA  NA    70.0    NA 5.7 
1995-1999  6.1  -6.5    77.3    12.5 0.8 
2000-2007  4.2  -0.4    21.1    -2.3 2.1 
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(a) Notes: short term real interest rate: money market rate (South Africa; Brazil), interbank money 
market rate (Turkey, Malaysia), bank rate (China); deflator: consumption deflator; figures in brackets 
indicate the growth-interest rate differential);  
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online 
(b) Notes: NA = not available 
Source: South Africa: SARB monthly bulletin time series; Brazil: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
online; Turkey: European Economy. Statistical annex April 2009; China: National Bureau of Statistics 
online 
(c) Notes: - = deficit 
Source: South Africa: SARB monthly bulletin time series; Brazil: IPEA data online; Turkey: IMF, SPO 
(State Planning Organization) 
(d)Notes: Data for Turkey only 2004 - 2007  
Source: South Africa: SARB online; Brazil: IBGE online data; Turkey: European Economy – statistical 
annex 2009 and Everhart/Sumlinsky (2001); Malaysia: Everhart/Sumlinsky (2001) 
(e) Notes: NULC for industry; * break in data 
Source: OECD Unit labour costs online data       
 
A major part of the problem has been pointed out by Easterly/Irwin/Serven (2007): fiscal 
consolidation is commonly mastered only to the detriment of public investment and, as public 
investment is a precondition for (long term) private investment, future growth – jeopardising 
the very objective of fiscal adjustment: public debt reduction. 
 
Tab. 5 (d) shows the problem facing SABT: not only is the level of public investment far too 
low for EMEs that try to catch up with highly developed countries (see Malaysia, where data 
availability is unfortunately restricted) but it is also declining under the severe pressure of 
fiscal austerity – among SABT, South Africa appears to have maintained the most stable 
development of public investment even during the most recent sub-period, while Brazil’s 
public investment performance is the worst of all. 
 
C.   Wage setting and inflation fighting 
 
SABT has seen some success in taming inflation by tying the hands of its central bankers 
either by way of exchange rate or inflation targeting starting in the mid-1990s and adopting 
implicit or full-fledged IT in early 2000s and, henceforth, ending explicit and implicit 
indexation. However, ever since IT has been put in place, SABT’s central banks confronted 
difficulties in meeting the announced inflation targets: in most years, actual inflation 
exceeded the inflation range ex post that was set ex ante or, at least, only managed to keep 
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it at the upper end of the range. Hence, there is evidence of an unsettled claims conflict. 
     
Assuming, as Post Keynesianism does, mark-up pricing over costs, nominal unit labour cost 
(NULC) developments become the major factor in determining (core) inflation. If wage 
developments and, hence, inflation were heavily dependent on output and employment gaps, 
a deflationary outcome would appear to be unavoidable in countries with substantial 
unemployment (officially above 20% in South Africa, which is a magnitude not unrealistic 
also for Brazil and Turkey if the huge amount of informal unemployment is also accounted 
for). Put differently, the downward rigidity of nominal wages in the presence of marked labour 
market disequilibria serves as a stabilising device once the working of the real balance effect 
has been rejected (see Fellner 1957, Dullien 2006) – wage policy becoming an internal 
nominal anchor.
26 Yet, what is crucial for the stability in a world that does not oscillate around 
a natural unemployment rate, renders IT monetary policy less effective: the lower the wage 
and price elasticity with respect to employment or output gaps (i.e. the flatter the Phillips 
curve), the more difficult it is to pursue inflation and output stability with a single monetary 
policy rule (see Carlin/Soskice 2006: 147). Moreover, not only the slope of the wage policy 
reaction function is important but also the incorporated claims conflict as indicated by its 
location: the more willingly wage policy takes the tolerated inflation rate into account, the less 
likely is a conflict with the central bank and vice versa. 
 
As can be seen from tab. 5 (e), NULC developments in South Africa and, most clearly, in 
Turkey reflect these claims conflicts. The influence of NULC on inflation in South Africa is as 
well established (see e.g. Aron/Muellbauer/Smit 2003, Burger/Marinkov 2006) as the main 
factors determining NULC: past consumer price inflation, the wholesale price inflation of 
domestically produced goods, real house prices, and other minor factors (see 
Aron/Muellbauer/Smit 2003). Finally, there are several empirical traces of local pushfullness 
and ‘insider behaviour’: Burger/Marinkov (2006: 183) as well as Nell (2000) find a statistically 
significant relation between the output gap and the change in the output gap on the one 
hand, and the inflation rate on the other hand but only in an upward direction. And 
Aron/Muellbauer/Smit (2003: 27) report “(t)he other striking finding is how dominant are the 
                                                  
26 Empirical studies show that wage policy provides that nominal anchor in South Africa (see e.g. 
Hodge (2002), Nell (2000), Burger/Marinkov [2006]) while in Turkey that function appears to be 
played by the minimum wage (see Duman 2006).   
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concerns of workers in wage setting rather than of firms.” In a Post Keynesian conflicting 
claims framework, this implies a high NAIRU.  
 
For Brazil and Turkey, the minimum wage and its annual increase appears to have a strong 
influence on overall wage and NULC developments – although this influence is eroding in 
Brazil with the regime change from state-administered wage setting to collectively bargained 
wage policy (see Carneiro/Henley 1998).
27 As many welfare payments are linked to the 
minimum wage development resulting in a high public expenditure elasticity of the minimum 
wage, there is a strong incentive in Brazil to keep it low. In Turkey, the tri-partite ‘Minimum 
Wage Fixing Committee’ negotiates minimum wages with a backward-looking bias 
introducing some inflation inertia into the wage-setting process. Although there are not 
enough studies on the labour markets and collective bargaining processes in Brazil and 
Turkey to convincingly claim a ‘Soskice case’ wage and monetary policy conflict, some 
institutional arrangements such as the minimum wage arguably trigger such a conflict 
scenario (see Senses 1994 and Senses 1996 for Turkey and Carneiro/Henley 1998 for 
Brazil).  However, a comparison with two European transitional and ‘catching-up’ countries 
under the regime of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy – Spain as European 
Monetary Union (EMU) member and Poland as EU member preparing for joining EMU – 
indicate that only Brazil’s NULC developments may be compatible with the price stability 
regime of a ‘tentative’ central bank.  
  
D.  Traces of policy coordination? 
 
As demonstrated in the theoretical part above, a functional market constellation can best be 
expected to prevail under conditions of cooperation among the macroeconomic actors 
(procedural norm). In order to evolve and stabilize, cooperation needs an institutional setting 
which not only allows for communication among the actors but also the credible assigning, 
monitoring and sanctioning of policy rules (norms of contents). 
  
All three countries have established tripartite institutions of social dialogue: the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) in South Africa, the National Labour 
                                                  
27 Lemos (2004) shows that after the regime change in Brazil, only those wages for low-skilled, low-
income workers are clearly affected by the minimum wage; see also Carneiro (2006) 
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Forum (NLF) in Brazil and the Economic and Social Council (ESC) in Turkey. The objectives 
of these institutions are manifold (see e.g. Houston/Liebenberg/Dichaba 2001; Atan 2004; 
ITUC 2007): to democratise economic policy-making in general, to parallel institution-building 
in the EU in the case of Turkey, to reorganise labour relations and labour law in the case of 
Turkey and, in the case of South Africa and Turkey, to coordinate the policies of the 
macroeconomic actors.  
 
In a recent paper, the South African Reserve Bank researcher Swanepoel (2004: 734) 
argued: “The close relationship between monetary and fiscal policies carries with it the 
possibility of conflict and sub-optimal policies,… . Coordinated monetary and fiscal policies 
are extremely important as uncoordinated policies could potentially slow the economy’s long-
term growth rate or cause unwanted surges in inflation”. Having highlighted the need for 
coordination and the consequences of its failure, Swanepoel convincingly shows that the 
macro-economic policy mix in post-apartheid South Africa has been un-coordinated. 
Moreover, the lack of coordination appears to be more pronounced in times of slack growth 
than in times of prosperity, i.e. Government and the SARB cooperate better in breaking a 
boom than in pushing out of a slump.  A similar sceptical judgement could be made about the 
working of the ESC in Turkey (see Atan 2004) where the Central Bank of Turkey is not even 
an official participant of the social dialogue and of the NFL in Brazil, whose working has been 
largely in vain (see ITUC 2007). 
 
Whether the failure of efficiently organised cooperation among the macroeconomic actors is 
due to a bias against corporatist ideas, to shortcomings in the institutional set-up or to simply 
ignorance in statutory objectives can remain an open question at this point – clearly the 
empirical picture of uncooperative Nash equilibria in SABT finds support in the established 
fact of missing traces of policy coordination.     
 
V.  Market constellations in comparison – anything to learn?  A 
conclusion 
 
This study set out to answer the question whether SABT‘s macroeconomic governance can 
be expected to achieve the high growth rates that the countries need to deal with their fierce 
unemployment and poverty problems, to let them catch-up with per-capita GDP of highly 
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developed nations and to make them global growth engines of the ‘After-Depression era’. In 
order to make sense of this kind of investigation, a theoretical model different from the new 
classical world of general equilibrium with its macroeconomic policy ineffectiveness 
postulates had to be chosen. Taking a Post Keynesian market constellation approach 
allowed us to seek answers to the above-mentioned questions by highlighting the institutional 
set-up of  macroeconomic policy: the governance systems of the SABT countries. Assuming 
that institutions provide guidance for actor’s behaviour, we were able to give theoretical and 
empirical evidence that the widely acknowledged under-performance of SABT with respect to 
per-capita growth and employment is rooted in a macroeonomic policy stance that is 
ideologically founded (‘Washington Consensus’) and aggravated by a lack of coordination.  
 
Our research suggests that a restrictive monetary policy based on mainstream IT in a 
tentative fashion, an austere fical policy based on ‘sound finance’ principles and a 
uncompromising wage policy based on decentralised, locally pushfull collective bargaining 
structures and indexed minimum wages caused a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium which 
taylored a far too narrow macroeconomic coat for SABT. 
 



































This very general judgement can now further be specified: in fig. 3, an attempt is made to 
visualise the comparative policy stances of the SABT countries in a radar chart (see 
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Bogan/English 1994) – the further away from the origin and, hence, the bigger the field 
covered, the more functional a policy stance is
28. In addition to the three policy areas 
discussed in detail above, a fourth dimension – ‘external conditions’ – is added in order to 
capture growth stimuli that emerge from foreign trade. Brazil is the only SABT country where 
a current account surplus positively contributes to growth in aggregate demand, while in 
South Africa and Turkey the current account turned heavily into deficit. A gradual decline of 
the Real Effective Excange Rate (REER) in Brazil and a slight (Turkey) and a heavier (South 
Africa) rise in REER in the two other SABT countries explain these developments to a great 
extent (see OECD 2006b: 29; OECD 2008a: 29; OECD 2008b: 123). By attributing a rank to 
the different degrees of functionality (origin: 0, higher degree of functionality from 1 to 3), we 
are able to cardinally measure and compare the overall market constellations. With a 
combined rank of 9, South Africa gets the highest cardinal measure, Brazil scores 7 and 
Turkey 5. Although these cardinal scales measure solely qualitative, no exact quantitatives 
differences,  the overall ranking matches the relative development established in tab. 3. We 
are painfully aware that this level of empirical testing is not very sophisticated, yet until 
internationally comparable data on inflation and output gaps and on structural (primary) fiscal 
balances become available for periods long enough to draw reliable conclusions, this is as 
good as it gets. At this point, it appears impossible to reject the idea that macroeconomic 
governance in the ‘market constellation’ sense put forward in this paper alters the relative 
performance of economic development. However, economic governance is based on the 
economic activity of individual and corporate actors which is, at least partly, independent of 
economic governance – otherwise it would be difficult to explain why Turkey’s absolute 
performance (in terms of average per-capita GDP growth rates) is still the best among SABT.       
 
The foregoing analysis does not lend support to the mainstream macroeconomic policy 
recommandations of austere policy assignment known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ which 
has been imposed on many EME countries by the IMF and strictly followed by SABT 
countries. Contrary to mainstream presumptions, Washington consensus type policies did 
not pave the way for sustained high growth with low inflation, but are responsible for 
economic under-achievements and the unresolved problems of unemployment and poverty.  
This did not go unnoticed in SABT particularily as the political regime shifts in the past were 
                                                  
28 One should keep in mind that the radar chart in fig. 3 only measures the relative performance of the 
SABT countries. Hence a rank of 3 only implies that the respective policy regime is less 
dysfunctional than a rank of 1 or 2. It does not imply that it is functional – this would be in 
contradiction to the forgoing analysis. 
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mainly explained by the desire of the people to address these problems. Yet, only in South 
Africa, the ANC government has reacted by replacing the former GEAR strategy with a new 
‘Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa’ (AsgiSA).  However, instead of 
tackling the dysfunctional market constellation, AsgiSA is adressing supply-side constraints 
(shortcomings of infrastructure, shortages of skilled labour, regulatory deficiencies) very 
much in line with recommandations provided by the OECD for Brazil and Turkey (see OECD 
2006b; OECD 2008b). Although supply-side constraints may exist, their elimination will not 
be enough unless the macroeconomic coat allows for higher per-capita growth. The 
recommandation derived from our study would be to re-design the existing tri-partite 
institutions of social dialogue into an effective body that turns assignment into cooperation by 
establishing, monitoring and sanctioning policy rules along the lines exposed in chapter 
II.b.5. As such a cooperative strategy is based on the credible assumption that price stability 
and fiscal sustainability is not sacrificied, it cannot be ruled out that a pro-growth market 
constellation advocated here needs a preceding sequence of credibility-builtup. However, it 
is high time that this period comes to an end in SABT and ‘times of cooperation’ are 
announced.         
  
  29  
References 
 
Ajam, T. (2005); Review of South African Fiscal Policy 1994 – 2004; paper presented at the 
conference on ‘South African Policy Under Democracy: A Ten Year Review’ held at 
Stellenbosch University, 28 – 29
th October 2005, unpublished manuscript 
Akerlof, G.A. (2007); The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics; in: American Economic 
Review, Vol. 97, pp. 5 - 36  
Aron, J., Muellbauer, J. (2002); Interest rate effects on output: evidence from a GDP 
forecasting model for South Africa; IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 49, pp. 185 – 213 
Aron, J., Muellbauer, J. (2006): Review of Monetary Policy in South Africa Since 1994: 
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) Working Paper No. 7, Oxford 
University  
Aron, J., Muellbauer, J.N.J., Smit, B.W. (2003); Modelling the Inflation Process in South 
Africa; Keynote Address Eight Annual Conference on Econometric Modelling for 
Africa, Stellenbosch University, 1 – 4
th July 2003 (unpublished manuscript) 
Araujo, A., Santos, R. (2007); Inflation Targeting, Credibility and Confidence Crisis, Banco 
Central do Brasil Working Paper Series No. 140 
Argüero, J., Carter, M.R., May, J. (2006); Poverty and Inequality in the First Decade of South 
Africa’s Democracy: What can be learnt from Panel Data? Working Paper of the 
Department of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison  
Atan, S. (2004); Europeanisation of Turkish peak business organisations and the Turkey-EU 
relations; in: Ugur, M., Canafe, N. (eds.); Turkey and European Integration. Accession 
proposals and issues, London, pp. 100 - 122 
Auer, P., Popova, N. (2003); Labour market policy for restructuring Turkey: The need for 
more active policies, ILO Employment Paper No. 2003/51, Geneva 
Balls, E., O’Donnell, G. (2002); Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy. Towards 
greater economic stability, Houndsmill  
Barbosa-Filho, N.H. (2008); Inflation Targeting in Brazil: 1999 – 2006; in: International 
Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 22, No.2, pp. 187 - 200 
Barro, R. (1974); Are government bonds net wealth?; in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
82, No. 6, pp. 1095 – 1117 
Blais, A., Blake, D., Dion, S. (1993); Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of 
government in liberal democracies; in: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, 
pp. 40 – 62 
Bogan, C.E., English, M.J. (1994); Benchmarking for Best Practice: Winning through 
innovative adaptation, New York 
Bowles, S., Boyer, R. (1995); Wages, aggregate demand, and employment in an Open 
Economy: an empirical investigation; in: Epstein, G., Gintis, H. (eds.); Macroeconomic 
policies after the conservative era. Studies in investment, savings and finance, 
Cambridge   
Burger, P., Marinkov, M. (2006); The South African Phillips Curve: How applicable is the 
Gordon model?; in: South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 74, No.2, pp. 172 - 189 
Caerneiro, F.G. (2006); The Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Brazilian Labor Market; in: 
Marshalle, M.I. (ed.); Economics of Unemployment, Hauppauge NY, pp. 187 – 216 
  30  
Calmfors, L, Driffil, J. (1988); Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic 
performance; in: Economic Policy, No.1, pp. 14 – 61 
Camara Neto, A.F., Vernengo, M. (2007); Lula’s Social Policies: New Wine in Old Bottles?; 
in: Arestis, P., Saad-Filho, A. (eds.); Political Economy of Brazil. Recent Economic 
Performance, Houndsmill, pp. 73 – 93 
Carlin, W., Soskice, D. (2006); Macroeconomics. Imperfections, Institutions and Policies, 
Oxford 
Carneiro, F.G., Henley, A.(1998); Wage Determination in Brazil: The Growth of Union 
Bargaining Power and Informal Employment; in: The Journal of Development Studies, 
Vol. 34, No.4, pp. 117 – 138 
Cassim, R. (2004); Reflections on South Africa’s first wave of economic reforms; in: 
Padayachee, V. (ed.); The development decade? Economic and Social Change in 
South Africa, 1994 – 2004, Cape Town, pp. 55 – 85 
Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gerler, M. (1998); Monetary policy rules in practice: some international 
evidence; in: European Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp. 1033 – 1068 
Cömert, H., Yeldan A. Erinç. (2008); Interest Rate Smoothing and Macroeconomic Instability 
under Post-Capital Account Liberalization in Turkey, PERI (Political Economy 
Research Institute) Working Paper Series, No: 173 
Cordero, J.A.(2008); Economic growth under alternative monetary regimes: inflation targeting 
vs real exchange rate targeting; in: International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 
22, No.2, pp. 145 – 160 
Davidson, P. (1994); Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Theory, Cheltenham 
Dullien, S. (2006); Rethinking the Role of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in a World 
Without the Real balance Effect; in: Intervention. Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, No.2, 
pp. 279 – 304 
Duman, A. (2006);Institutional settings and organizational forms: Three essays (January 1, 
2006). Electronic Doctoral Dissertations for UMass Amherst. Paper AAI3242304. 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3242304 
Dutt, A.K. (2002); Thirlwall’s Law and uneven development; in: Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, Vol. 24, No.3, pp. 367 – 390 
Easterly, W., Irwin. T., Serven, L. (2007); Walking up the down escalator: Public investment 
and fiscal stability; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4158, 
Washington 
Eichengreen, B. (2002); Can Emerging Markets Float? Should they inflation target? Banco 
Central do Brasil Working Paper Series No. 36 
Epstein, G. (2002); Employment-oriented central bank policy in an integrated world economy: 
A reform proposal for South Africa, PERI Working Paper No. 39, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst 
Epstein, G. , Yeldan, E. (2008); Inflation targeting, employment creation and economic 
development: assessing the impacts and policy alternatives; in: International Review 
of Applied Economics, Vol. 22, No.2, pp. 131 - 144 
Fellner, W. (1957); What is Surviving? An Appraisal of Keynesian Economics on its 
Twentieth Aniversary; in: American Economic Review, Vol. 47, pp. 67 – 76 
Friedman, M. (1968); The Role of Monetary Policy, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 58, 
pp. 1 - 17 
  31  
Fritsche, U., Heine, M., Herr, H., Horn, G., Kaiser, C. (2005); Macroeconomic regime and 
economic development: the case of USA; in: Hein, E. et al. (eds.); Macroeconomic 
policy coordination in Europe and the role of the trade unions, Brussels, pp. 69 - 107 
Giambiagi, F., Ronci, M. (2004); Fiscal Policy and Debt Sustainability: Cardosos’s Brazil, 
1995 – 2002, IMF Working Paper  04/156 
Ewerhard, S.S., Sumlinsky, M. (2001); Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries. 
Statistics 1970 – 2000; IFC Working Papers 44, Washington 
Gelb, S. (2001); Socio-political Risk, Confidence and Firm Investment in South Africa, The 
Edge Institute, Johannesburg 
Gibson, B., van Seventer, B.E. (2000); Real wages, Employment and Macroeconomic Policy 
in a Structuralist Model of South Africa, University of Vermont (unpublished 
manuscript) 
Goldman Sachs (2007); BRICS and beyond, New York 
Goncalves, C.E.S., Salles, J.M. (2008); Inflation targeting in emerging economies: What do 
the data say?; in: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 85, No. 1-2, pp. 312 – 318 
Heise, A.(1999); Grenzen der Deregulierung, Berlin 
Heise, A. (2001); New Politics, Münster 
Heise, A. (2006); Market Constellations and Macroeconomic Policymaking: Institutional 
Impacts on Economic Performance; in: Intereconomics – Review of European 
Economic Policy, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 272 – 281 
Heise, A. (2008); Economic Governance and Employment. Policy, Polity and Politics of 
Economic Rise and Decline, Münster 
Heise, A. (2009); A Post Keynesian theory of economic policy – filling a void; in Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 31. No.3, pp. 383 – 403 
Hodge, D. (2002); Inflation versus unemployment in South Africa: Is there a trade off?; in: 
South African Journal of Economics; vol. 70, No.3, pp. 417 - 443 
Houston, G., Liebenberg, I., Diachaba, W. (2001); Interest group participation in the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council; in: Houston, G. (ed.); Public 
Participation in democratic governance in South Africa, Pretoria, pp. 17 – 81 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (2007); Annual Survey of violations of trade 
union rights 2007, in: https:// survey07.ituc-csi.org 
Kahn, B., Farrell, G.N. (2002); South African real interest rates in comparative perspective: 
theory and evidence; South African Reserve Bank Occasional Paper No. 17 
Keynes, J.M. (1943); The long-term problem of full employment (1943); in: Moggridge, D. 
(ed.); The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (CW), Vol. 27, London 1980, 
pp. 320 – 329 
Lemos, S. (2004); The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Wages, Employment and Prices; IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1135, Bonn 
Lucas, R.E. Jr. (1972); Expectations and the Neutrality of Money; in: Journal of Economic 
Theory, Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 103 – 124 
Nayyar, D.(2008); China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the World Economy. Engines of 
Growth?, UNI-WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2008/05, Helsinki 
Nel, P.S. (ed.) (2002); South African employment relations: theory and practice, Pretoria 
  32  
Nell, K.S. (2000); Is inflation a precondition for faster growth? The South African case, 
(unpublished paper) 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1994); Policy Games: Coordination and Independence in Monetary and 
Fiscal Policies; in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2, pp. 139 – 216 
OECD (2006a); African Economic Outlook 2005/2006, Paris 
OECD (2006b); Economic Survey: Brazil, Paris 
OECD (2008a); Economic Survey: South Africa, Paris 
OECD (2008b); Economic Survey: Turkey, Paris 
OECD (2009); Economic Outlook No. 85, Paris 
Önis, Z., Senses, F. (2007); Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: 
Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development, in: METU Studies in 
Development,Vol. 34, No.2, pp. 251 - 286 
Palley, T. (1996); Post Keynesian Economics, Houndsmill 
Plenderleith, I. (2003); Is Monetary Policy different in Africa?, Symposium on Monetary Policy 
and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 28 – 30
th August 2003 
Priewe, J., Herr, H. (2005); The Macroeconomics of Development and Poverty Reduction, 
Baden-Baden. Strategies Beyond the Washington Consensus 
Reis, E.P. (2006); Inequality in Brazil: Facts and Perceptions, Therborn, G. (ed.); Inequalities 
of the World. New theoretical Frameworks, multiple empirical Approaches, London, 
pp. 193 – 219 
Rogoff, K. (1985); The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target; in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 100, pp. 1169 – 1190 
Routledge, B.R., von Amsberg, J. (2002), Social Capital and Growth, in: Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 50, Issue 1, pp. 167-193. 
Saad-Filho, A. (2005); From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: neoliberal 
agendas for economic development; in: Saad-Filho, A., Johnston, D. (eds.); 
Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, London, pp. 113 - 119 
Senses, F. (1994); Labor market responses to structural adjustments and instutional 
pressures: The Turkish case; in: METU Studies in Development, Nol. 21, No. 3, pp. 
405 – 448 
Senses, F. (1996); Structural Adjustment Policies and Employment in Turkey; in: New 
Perspectives on Turkey, Fall, pp. 65 – 93 
Smithin, J. (2007); A real interest rate rule for monetary policy?; in: Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, Vol. 30, No.1, pp. 101 – 118 
Soskice, D. (1990); Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced 
Industrialized Countries; in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6, No.4, pp. 36 - 
47 
Swanepoel, J.A. (2004); The monetary-fiscal policy mix in South Africa; in: South African 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 730 – 757 
Taylor, J.B. (1993); Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice; Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference on Public Policy, Vol. 45, pp. 195 – 214 
Taylor, J.B. (2000); Reassassing Discretionary Fiscal Policy; in: Journal of Economic 
  33  
Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 21 – 36 
World Bank (2004); World Development Indicators, Washingron D.C. 
World Bank (2005); Joint poverty assessment report, Vol. 1 + 2, Washington D.C.  
World Bank (2007); World Development Indicators, Washington D.C. 
Wray, L.R. (2007); A Post Keynesian view of central bank independence, policy targets, and 
the rules versus discretion debate; in: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 30, 
No.1, pp. 119 – 141 
Wyplosz, C. (2005); Fical Policy: Institutions versus Rules; in: National Institute Economic 
Review No. 191, No.1, pp. 64 – 78 
  34  
Bisher erschienene Arbeitspapiere 
 
No. 1 Arne Heise: EMU, Coordinanted Macroeconomic Policies and a Boost 
to Employment in the European Union, September 2002  
 
Nr. 2 Arne Heise: Makroökonomisches Economic Governance: Makro-
Dialoge auf nationaler und EU-Ebene, Februar 2002 
 
Nr. 3 Arne Heise: Das Ende der Sozialdemokratie? Konstruktiv-kritische 
Anmerkungen zu einer dramatischen Entwicklung, Mai 2003 
 
Nr. 4 Arne Heise: Optimale Verschuldung, Konsolidierungstrajektorien und 
Makroeffekte, Oktober 2003 
 
Nr. 5 Arne Heise: Polit-ökonomische Betrachtung zur Sozialdemokratie. 
Die Wirtschaftspolitik der ‚Neuen Mitte’ im Lichte von Public Choice- und 
Agenda-Theorie, November 2003 
 
Nr. 6 Arvid Kaiser: Finanzielle Selbstbeteiligung in der 
Gesundheitsversorgung, Dezember 2003 
 
Nr. 7 Arne Heise: Deutsche Finanzpolitik zwischen Wachstum und 
Konsolidierung, März 2004 
 
Nr. 8 Leonhard Hajen: Steuerung über Preise erfordert Stewardship, April 
2004 
 
Nr. 9 Wulf Damkowski/ Anke Rösener: Good Governance auf der lokalen 
Ebene, Juni 2004 
 
Nr. 10 Anke Rösner/ Wulf Damkowski: Gender Controlling in der 
Kommunalverwaltung, Juni 2004 
 
No. 11 Arne Heise: The Economic Policies of German ‚Third Wayism’ in the 
Light of Agenda Theory, October 2004 
 
Nr. 12 Sybille Raasch: Antidiskriminierungsgesetze: Zum 
Umsetzungsstand der neuen EU-Antidiskriminierungsrichtlinien in 
Deutschland, Dezember 2004  
 
Nr. 13 Leonhard Hajen: Präventionsgesetz im Interessenkonflikt zwischen 
Bund, Ländern und Sozialversicherung, Dezember 2004 
 
  35  
No. 14 Arne Heise: Limitations to Keynesian Demand Management 
through monetary policy – whither Cartesian policy control, December 
2004 
 
Nr. 15 Norman Paech: Die europäische Verfassung – Ein Schritt zur 
Demokratisierung der EU?, April 2005 
 
No. 16 Arne Heise: Political Economy of Meritocracy, July 2005 
 
Nr. 17 Arne Heise: Konzentration auf das Kerngeschäft – Anforderungen 
an eine erneuerte sozialdemokratische Wirtschaftspolitik, November 2005 
 
No. 18 Arne Heise: Market constellations and macroeconomic policy-
making: institutional impacts on economic performance, February 2006 
 
Nr. 19 Arne Heise: Keynesianismus, Sozialdemokratie und die 
Determinanten eines Regierungs- und Politikwechsels.Das Stabilitäts- und 
Wachstumsgesetz von 1967 im Lichte der Agenda-Theorie, August 2006 
 
Nr. 20 Harry Friebel: Wähler-Macht der geburtenstarken Jahrgänge, 
Oktober 2006 
Nr. 21 Arne Heise: Das Ende der neoklassischen Orthodoxie? Wieso ein 
methodischer Pluralismus gut täte, März 2007 
No. 22 Arne Heise: How to create a growth-oriented market constellation 
for South Africa, March 2007 
Nr. 23 Toralf Pusch: Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion, April 
2007 
No.24 Ruth Hoekstra, Cécile Horstmann, Juliane Knabl, Derek Kruse, 
Sarah Wiedemann: Germanizing Europe? The Evolution of the European 
Stability and Growth Pact, May 2007 
  
Nr. 25 Holger Brecht-Heitzmann: Das EU-Grünbuch zum Arbeitsrecht. 
‚Flexicurity’ als Patentrezept für das Arbeitsrecht in der Europäischen 
Union?, Mai 2007  
 
Nr. 26 Martina Kliewe: Die Entwicklung der Corporate Finance Strukturen 
deutscher Unternehmen und deren Auswirkungen auf die 
Arbeitsbeziehungen. Juli 2007 
 
Nr. 27 Arne Heise: Erlebt Deutschland ein neues Wirtschaftswunder? 
Betrachtungen auf Grundlage der postkeynesianischen 
Marktkonstellationsforschung, Januar 2008 
  36  
 
Nr. 28 Arne Heise: A Post Keynsian Theory of Economic Policy – Filling a 
Void, March 2008 
 
Nr. 29 Toralf Pusch: EZB contra Gewerkschaften? Mit Reputationsaufbau 
zur Vollbeschäftigung in Europa? März 2008 
 
Nr. 30 Burak Öztoprak: Ausgestaltung der zukünftigen 
Hochschulfinanzierung unter allokativen und distributiven Gesichtspunkten 
Nr. 31 Arne Heise/Toralf Pusch:  Central Banks, Trade Union and 
Reputation – Is there Room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the EU?, 
September 2008 
Nr. 32 Arne Heise: Theorie und Politik der Depression – Zur 
Verantwortlichkeit der Ökonomen, September 2009 
  37 